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Universal Jurisdiction in Absentia:

I.

Introduction:

In recent years, the issue of universal jurisdiction has received a great deal of attention from
international jurists. While the existence of some form of universal jurisdiction for certain
serious international crimes, such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity has
generally been recognized, the exact parameters of the doctrine have not yet been defined. This
paper will address the question of whether international law requires the presence of the offender
in a forum state for universal jurisdiction to exist. This issue was recently addressed by the
International Court of Justice1 in Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000.2 It will
be argued that pursuant to the ruling of the P.C.I.J. in the Lotus case, international law currently
permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia. In the alternative, it will be argued that
a customary rule of international law to that effect is in the process of emerging. An examination
of this development in light of the historical and philosophical justifications for the existence of
universal jurisdiction and the policy considerations it entails will follow. On this basis, it will be
argued that the recognition of universal jurisdiction in absentia constitutes an undesirable
development in international law.

II.

The I.C.J. Ruling:

On April 11, 2000, an investigating judge of the Brussels tribunal de première instance issued an
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international arrest warrant in absentia,3 against Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, at that time
Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.4 Ndombasi was charged
with grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,5 and crimes against humanity
pursuant to the Law of 16 June 1993 Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of the
International Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977
Additional Thereto, as amended by the Law of 19 February 1999 Concerning the Punishment of
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,6 in relation to allegations that in August
1998, he made speeches inciting racial hatred against Tutsi refugees in the D.R.C., referring to
them as “vermin” and calling for their extermination.7

On October 17, 2000, the D.R.C. instituted proceedings contesting the validity of the
international warrant before the I.C.J. Initially, the D.R.C. impugned the validity of the warrant
on two grounds. Firstly, it argued that the warrant violated the rule of customary international
law that a sitting Minister of Foreign Affairs enjoys absolute immunity from prosecution before
foreign municipal tribunals. Secondly, it argued that Belgium lacked jurisdiction to issue the
warrant, since universal jurisdiction was only exercisable if the accused was present in the forum
state at the time the warrant was issued. This second argument was subsequently dropped from
the Congo’s final submissions.

The majority of the Court held that the non ultra petitia rule prevented it from ruling on the
jurisdictional issue, since it was not raised by the parties in their final submissions. It went on to
consider the issue of immunity, and concluded that as a matter of customary international law,
3
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Ministers of Foreign Affairs enjoy absolute immunity from prosecution in foreign municipal
courts while they hold office, and that no exception to this premise existed for war crimes or
crimes against humanity.

Justices Van Den Wyngaert, Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal and Guillaume, disagreed with
the majority on the application of the non ultra petitia rule, holding that the issue of jurisdiction
should have been addressed, since it was not possible to conceive of absolute “immunity from
the jurisdiction of municipal courts”, without determining whether such jurisdiction existed in
the first place. In addition, although Justices Bula-Bula, Rezek and Ranjeva agreed that the non
ultra petitia rule prevented the Court from ruling on the question of jurisdiction, they
nevertheless made passing comments on the subject of universal jurisdiction. Justice Van Den
Wyngaert held that universal jurisdiction in absentia was permissible in international law under
the decision of the P.C.I.J. in the Lotus case. Justices Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal
agreed, provided that (1) all applicable immunities are respected, (2) the national State of the
accused person is first given the opportunity to act upon the charges alleged, (3) the charges are
laid by a prosecutor or juge d’instruction who acts in full independence, without links to or
control by the government of the State, and (4) it is reserved for only the most heinous
international crimes.8 Justices Guillaume, Ranjeva, Rezek, and Bula-Bula, on the other hand,
held that as a matter of customary international law, the presence of the accused is required for
universal jurisdiction to be exercised.
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It is unfortunate that the majority of the I.C.J. declined to consider the existence of universal
jurisdiction in absentia, as the issue is of increasing importance in international law. While it is
true that the Court’s ruling with respect to immunity renders the question of jurisdiction moot
with respect to sitting heads of state and Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the issue is bound to
resurface when these officials step down and face criminal liability for certain acts committed
outside their official capacity. In addition, the question of jurisdiction is of primary importance in
cases involving the prosecution of ordinary citizens who may not benefit from immunity in
international law.

III.

Universal Jurisdiction In Absentia and the Current State of International Law:

Four types of jurisdiction have traditionally been recognized in international law. Territorial
jurisdiction exists for the prosecution of crimes committed on State territory (‘subjective
territorial jurisdiction’), or the effects of which are felt on State territory ( ‘objective territorial
jurisdiction’). Personal jurisdiction exists for crimes committed by (‘active personal
jurisdiction’) or against (‘passive personal jurisdiction’) national of the forum State. According
to the protection principle, States also have jurisdiction where an act or offence threatens their
‘security’.9 In each of these instances, there is some connection between the prosecuting State
and the accused or the act at issue. Universal jurisdiction, by contrast, is exercisable for a small
number of crimes in international law, such as piracy, slavery, war crimes, drug trafficking and
genocide.10 Although these crimes do not affect the forum State in particular, they are of such a
serious nature that perpetrators may be characterized as enemies of mankind in general, or, hostis
humani generis, and as such, any State has jurisdiction to try them.

5

The principles of international law regarding normative jurisdiction were set out by the P.C.I.J.
in the Lotus Case:

It does not, however follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own
territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot
rely on some permissive rule of international law... Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect
that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons,
property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is
only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt
the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.11

The general principle in international law is therefore that States are free to extend the
application of their laws as far as they desire, unless a rule of international law can be found
which prohibits the exercise of such jurisdiction. It is unlikely that a prohibition on the exercise
of universal jurisdiction in absentia exists. This was the view taken in the I.C.J. by Justices Van
Den Wyngaert, Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal. There is no treaty which expressly
prohibits States from exercising jurisdiction in absentia, and no evidence of a custom that such a
practice violates international law. The most that can be said is that, as will be demonstrated
below, is that States have rarely exercised such jurisdiction. However, in the Lotus case, the
P.C.I.J. stated,

Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found among the reported cases were sufficient to prove in
point of fact the circumstances alleged by the Agent for the French Government, it would merely show that
States had often, in practice abstained from instituting criminal proceedings, and not that they recognized
themselves as being obliged to do so; for only if such abstentions were based on their being conscious of
having a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international custom [emphasis added].12

As Judge Van Den Wyngaert points out, the failure of States to exercise universal jurisdiction in
absentia is attributable to considerations such as political convenience, public opinion, their
desire to avoid overburdening their judicial systems, and the practical challenges associated with
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gathering evidence and witnesses in distant States, rather than any conscious belief that there is a
custom that prohibits the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia.13

That being said, in recent years, the presumption of normative jurisdiction set out in the Lotus
decision has been challenged by members of the I.C.J. Accordingly, in the Case Concerning the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Justices Shahabuddeen and Bedjaoui
expressed doubts as to the doctrine’s continued applicability in the contemporary context
globalization, international cooperation, and an increasingly limited conception of State
sovereignty.14 In addition, as Justice Guillaume points out in his individual opinion, the P.C.I.J.
in the Lotus case expressed some doubt as to whether the presumption of normative jurisdiction
applied in the criminal context, and concluded that it was unnecessary to decide this point.15
Accordingly, it is possible that before asserting universal jurisdiction in absentia, States may be
required to point to the existence of a positive rule of law which permits this.

There is no treaty which presently recognizes the right of States to exercise universal jurisdiction
in absentia. Most of the treaties which currently provide for universal jurisdiction expressly state
that the accused should be found on the territory of the prosecuting State. Thus, for example, art.
36(2) of the SingleConvention on Narcotics and Drugs, 1961 provides that

11

The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Belgium), (1927), P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10 at 19 [hereinafter Lotus].
Ibid. at 28.
13
Arrest Warrant Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert, supra note 2 at para. 56 [hereinafter Van
Den Wyngaert]. For example, the a French Minister explained his opposition to a proposed amendment to the
French Penal Code allowing for universal jurisdiction in absentia in the following terms, “[e]n effet, si l’on retenait
sa proposition, nombre des victimes vivant en France déposeraient plainte, pour la plupart devant le tribunal de
grande instance de Paris. Cela provoquerait un embouteillage considérable qui aboutirait à l’effet inverse de celui
recherchée, car certaines exactions qui pourraient être sanctionnées ne le seraient jamais à cause de cet encomrement
artificiel. Nous sommes donc dace là face à un problème pratique.” Journal officiel de l’Assemblée nationale, 20
décembre 1994, 2e séance, p. 9446.
14
Case Concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), [1996] I.C.J. Rep.
341.
15
Arrest Warrant Case, Separate Opinion of President Guillaume, supra note 2 at para. 14 [hereinafter Guillaume].
12

7

Serious offences heretofore referred to committed either by nationals or by foreigners shall be prosecuted
by the Party in whose territory the offence was committed, or by the Party in whose territory the offender is
found if extradition is not acceptable in conformity with the law of the Party to which application is made...
[Emphasis added].16

The only exception is art. 146 of the Geneva Convention, which does not explicitly require the
accused to be present in the prosecuting State. It states, “[e]ach High Contracting Party shall be
under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be
committed... grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before
its own courts.” 17 Thus the treaty does not expressly require the presence of the accused in the
forum State in order for jurisdiction to be asserted. However, the use of the words “search for”
implies that parties to the Convention have an obligation to prosecute the perpetrators “found” as
a result of investigations in their territory.18

Customary international law also does not support the existence of a rule permitting States to
exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia. This is demonstrated by the municipal legislation and
case law. A majority of the States that have implemented the various conventions establishing
universal jurisdiction in their national legislation, expressly require the presence of the offender
on their territory before asserting jurisdiction. For example, Art. 689-1 of the French Penal Code
provides, “[p]ursuant to the international conventions referred to below, any person who renders
himself guilty outside the territory of the Republic of any of the offences enumerated in those
article may, if in France, be prosecuted and tried by French courts [emphasis added]...”
Similarly, s. 8 of the Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act states, “[a] person
who is alleged to have committed an offence under section 6 or 7 may be prosecuted for that
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offence if... after the time the offence is alleged to have been committed, the person is present in
Canada [emphasis added].19 The Australian War Crimes Act of 1945 (as amended in 1988) is
even more restrictive, and requires the requires that the accused be an Australian resident or
citizen at the time the offence was committed.20

Municipal case law also suggests that no custom has as of yet emerged recognizing a positive
right to assert universal jurisdiction in absentia. In Germany, courts have held that in order for
the federation to exercise universal normative jurisdiction there must be some “link” between the
accused and the State, such as the accused’s presence in the country.21 In Jorgic, a German Court
convicted a Bosnian Serb man living in Germany of war crimes, holding that Germany could
exercise universal jurisdiction, as the accused had been voluntary residing in Germany at the
time of his arrest.22 French courts have adopted a similar position. In re Javor, certain Bosnian
nationals attempted to file a complaint against certain Serbs not present in France, whom they
accused of acts of torture. The Cour de Cassation rejected lower court’s conclusion that the
French courts had jurisdiction to consider the complaint, holding that investigations and
prosecutions could not be initiated by authorities unless the accused was present in French
territory.23 The Supreme Court of the Netherlands has also insisted on the presence of the
accused before universal jurisdiction can be exercised under Dutch law. In re Bouterse, the
Dutch Supreme Court held that Holland could not prosecute the former leader of Suriname for
war crimes, since he was not present in Holland at any stage in the proceedings.24 Finally, in R.
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v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), Lord
Millett of the British House of Lords wrote that in order for Britain to exercise extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction without committing “an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of
another state...., the accused must be present in the forum state.”25

While it is true that the foregoing analysis suggests that no custom has emerged permitting States
to exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia, there are signs that such a custom is in the process
of emerging. Thus, for example, s. 8(1)(c)(iii) of the New Zealand International Crimes and
International Criminal Court Act 2000, states that “[p]roceedings may be brought for an
offence... whether or not the person accused was in New Zealand at the time that the act
constituting the offence occurred or at the time a decision was made to charge the person with an
offence.”26 While the Belgian Law which was invoked in the Arrest Warrant Case is not as clear,
it does not contain any express requirement that the accused be present in order for an
investigation or prosecution to be initiated. Art. 7 of the law merely states that “[t]he Belgian
courts shall be competent to deal with breaches provided for in the present Act, irrespective of
where such breaches have been committed.”27 Luxemburg, Bolivia, and Spain have enacted
similar statutes.28 Finally, the German government submitted a legislative proposal to the
German Parliament on January 16, 2002 which would introduce into the German Criminal Code
a provision stating, “[t]his Code governs all the punishable acts listed herein violating public
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international law, [and] in the case of felonies listed herein [this code governs] even if the act
was committed abroad and does not show any link to Germany [emphasis added].”29

With respect to municipal case law, the Dutch Court of Appeal explicitly held in the Bouterse30
case that the exercise of universal jurisdiction did not require Bouterse’s presence in the
Netherlands. In Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,31 the United States 6th Circuit Court of Appeal held that
an alleged Nazi war criminal could be extradited to Israel, since that nation, in addition to “any
other nation” was entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction despite Demjanjuk’s presence in the
United States. Finally, on November 4, 1998, the Criminal Division of the Spanish National
Court held unanimously that Spain has jurisdiction to try the crimes committed by former
Chilean president Augusto Pinochet. Although some of the alleged victims were Spanish
nationals, the court relied on the principle of universal jurisdiction, rather than passive personal
jurisdiction in its conclusions, despite the fact that Pinochet was not present in Spain.32

In sum, while the current state of international law does not support the existence of a customary
rule of international law entitling states to exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia, there is
evidence that states have become increasingly willing to assert the existence of such jurisdiction
in recent years. Therefore, even if the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia is not
permitted under the Lotus principle, it may be on the verge of becoming authorized by
international custom. The next section of this paper will attempt to determine whether this
development is consistent with the historical and philosophical underpinnings of the concept of
universal jurisdiction, and desirable from a policy point of view.
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IV.

Historical and Philosophical Rationales of the Concept of Universal Jurisdiction:

Grotius argued that wrote that violations of the rules of natural law constituted offenses against
all the societas generis humani, or universal society of humanity. Thus, he argued that all states
had an interest, and even a duty to punish international crimes. 33 This view has been articulated
in the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
which affirms “that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking
measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation [emphasis added].”34
Under this conception of ‘international community’, it is argued that since all States are
interested parties in cases involving the commission of certain serious crimes, there is no reason
to insist on any special link between the victim, the offender, and that State in order for universal
jurisdiction to be exercised.35

However, history suggests that a more direct State interest forms the basis for the exercise of
universal jurisdiction. Donnedieu de Vabres writes,

32
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Néanmoins, il fut admis pendant tout le moyen age, dans la doctrine italienne, et dans le droit qui
gouvernait les rapports des villes lombardes, qu’à l’égard de certaines catégories de malfaiteurs dangereux
– banniti, vagabundi, assassini, - la simple présence, sur le terrioire, du criminel impuni, étant une cause de
trouble, donnait vocation à la cité pour connaître de son crime.36

Thus, in the Middle Ages, it was assumed that certain dangerous criminals posed a threat to the
societies in which they were found, presumably since they were likely to commit repeat offenses.
It was for this reason that these jurisdictions were entitled to investigate and prosecute crimes
committed by these actors in other jurisdictions. Thus, it was the accused presence in the
jurisdiction and the dangers posed by him in that jurisdiction that justified the exercise of
universal jurisdiction. In his individual opinion, Justice Guillaume made a similar argument. He
wrote,

The question has, however, always remained open whether States other than the territorial State have
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute offenders. A wide debate on the subject began as early as the
foundation in Europe of the major modern States. Some writers, like Covarruvias and Grotius, pointed out
that the presence on the territory of a State of a foreign criminal peacefully enjoying the fruits of his crimes
was intolerable. They therefore maintained that it should be possible to prosecute perpetrators of certain
particularly serious crimes not only in the State on whose territory the crime was committed but also in the
country where they sought refuge [emphasis added]. 37

Thus, the basis for asserting universal jurisdiction lay in the impact of the accused presence in
the prosecuting State, i.e. the public outrage in that country at the prospect of permitting the
perpetrators of heinous crimes to be remain in their State and find themselves rewarded for
fleeing States which could otherwise exercise jurisdiction.

V.

Policy Implications:

The recognition of universal jurisdiction in absentia would have three principle consequences.

36
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Firstly, the exercise of universal jurisdiction in general would become more frequent as all States
would become empowered to try serious international crimes. While this might have the
advantage of reducing the impunity currently enjoyed by the perpetrators of heinous crimes, it
would also raise concerns regarding the stability of international relations, multiple prosecutions,
disproportionate use against non-Western nationals, and the future role of the International
Criminal Court. Secondly, the recognition of universal jurisdiction in absentia would be likely to
increase the speed with which international crimes are investigated and prosecuted, since states
seeking to exercise universal jurisdiction would not be required to wait for the accused to travel
to their country before initiating legal proceedings. It has been argued that this would have
important implications regarding the extent to which criminals are able to avoid justice for
extended periods of time, and also facilitate the gathering of evidence necessary for obtaining
convictions. Thirdly, it is arguable that the recognition of universal jurisdiction in absentia would
increase the scope for prosecuting international criminals in absentia (or par contumace). While
investigations in absentia are relatively common and uncontroversial in international law, the
same cannot be said of trials in absentia, which raise serious legal and policy concerns.

A.

More Frequent Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction:

If States such as Belgium are entitled to initiate proceedings in the absence of the accused, it
makes sense that they will do so with increasing frequency. Advocates of a broad conception of
universal jurisdiction argue that this will have the advantage of decreasing the extent to which
international criminals enjoy impunity with respect to their actions. It is clear that in most cases,
the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia would not lead to the incarceration or extradition
of defendants, particularly where there remain in their home state, which will be likely to refuse
14

extradition.38 However, it has been argued that the stigma associated with investigations and
prosecutions, even in absentia, will in some measure punish criminals, and have the effect of
deterring violations of crimes for which universal jurisdiction exists.

It has also been argued that investigations and prosecutions in absentia, will provide relief for
victims and their families even if the proceedings would not necessarily result in the
incarceration of the accused. Forum states would serve as ‘truth commissions’, providing a
permanent record of crimes such as torture, war crimes, and genocide. As Justice Goldstone of
the ICTY has stated, in relation to Rule 61 proceedings which reconfirm indictments despite the
accused’s failure to appear, “[t]here can be no justification for ignoring the rights of the victims
and of their families. They too, have a right to be heard and thereby begin their own healing
process and that of many tens of thousands of victims who will identify with them.”39

Furthermore, it has been suggested that the increasing the ability of foreign countries to assert
jurisdiction will have a catalyzing effect on States where crimes have been committed (and
consequently, where the accused often continues to reside), increasing the likelihood that the
accused will actually be brought to trial and punished.40 Following the indictment of Augusto
Pinochet and retired Argentinean Navy Captain Adolpho Scilingo, in the Spanish National Court,
170 complaints were brought by individuals against Pinochet in Chile. In addition, the Chilean
Supreme Court approved stripping Pinochet of his parliamentary immunity. The Spanish case
38
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turned the issue into a topic of national conversation, which in turn led to the institution of a
dialogue roundtable on the subject between military leaders, human rights lawyers, and
representatives of civil society.41 The Spanish action also led to a strengthening of the antiimpunity movement in Argentina, which has led to, inter alia, the repeal of legislation barring
the prosecution of Argentinean military officers, and the introduction of legislation expanding
the reparations offered to survivors of Argentinean concentration camps.

While there are therefore some clear benefits to the recognition of universal jurisdiction in
absentia, increasing the frequency with which this type of jurisdiction is exercised will pose the
risk of undermining the stability of international relations. The home State of the accused, or the
State where crimes have been committed are likely to view the assertion of universal jurisdiction
by foreign nations as an unwarranted intervention in their internal affairs. This risk is even more
acute in States which allow for the initiation of criminal proceedings by private individuals (actio
popularis) or where prosecutors are not subject to tight government control. In these countries,
proceedings instituted by prosecutors or private citizens could alienate States that the
government would not normally intend to risk offending through the exercise of universal
jurisdiction.42 This effect would be exacerbated if future decisions by international tribunals
adopt Justices Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal’s requirement that prosecutors must act “in
full independence, without links or control by the government of that State” in order for
universal jurisdiction in absentia to be exercised,43 as governments would be unable to stay
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prosecutions which would threaten the stability of their international relationships with other
States.

In addition, States might abuse universal jurisdiction to prosecute the nationals of enemy states
as a means of gaining a political advantage or impugning their reputation in the international
community.44 In some cases, States might initiate investigations and prosecutions even where the
allegations against an accused are clearly baseless. As a result, the exercise of universal
jurisdiction in absentia is likely to exacerbate tensions between states currently involved in a
conflict.45

Another concern raised by the recognition of universal jurisdiction in absentia is that multiple
prosecutions of the same individual would ensue, as the number of States entitled to exercise
jurisdiction would be substantially increased. While it is true that the possibility of multiple
prosecutions already exists as a necessary incident to the existence of extra-territorial forms of
jurisdiction such as personal or objective territorial jurisdiction, the number of prosecutions in
the cases of universal jurisdiction would be virtually unlimited. In practice many States would
not initiate proceedings, due to the high costs associated with investigating crimes committed in
another country, however some States, such as Belgium, have demonstrated a commitment to
exercising universal jurisdiction. Increasing the number of prosecutions and investigations would
inevitably lead to conflicts over access to evidence and the accused person, and would increase
the likelihood of conflicting decisions in certain instances, which would undermine the
legitimacy of the judicial systems in all States which have exercised jurisdiction.
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It has also been argued that a broadened conception of universal jurisdiction would be exercised
disproportionately by Western nations to prosecute non-Western nationals and leaders. Universal
jurisdiction has always been perceived by some as a means of imposing Western values on
weaker developing nations. Verhoeven writes,

La comptence universelle ... n’est que l’expression d’un pouvoir, et non de la justice, si certains seulement
en revendiquent l’exercise, tout compréhensiblement que soit le besoin d’un “procès” qu’éprouvent les
victimes d’infractions particulièrement odieuses. Plutôt que les intérêts de la justice et d’une communauté
internationale digne de ce nom, elle pourrait bien ne servir que ceux d’Etats occidentaux enclins à
maintenir dans une dépendence, néo-colonialiste qurait-on dit il y a plusieurs années, des sociétés
auxquelles ils imposent leur conception de la démocratie. Ce qui n’est sans doute pas très démocratique...46

A broad universal jurisdiction would also be used disproportionately to indict the nationals of
developing countries. As Justice Bula-Bula points out in his individual opinion in the Arrest
Warrant Case, complaints have been instituted before Belgian courts on the basis of Universal
Jurisdiction against Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivory Coast, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Denis Sassou
Nguesso of the Congo, Israel’s Ariel Sharon, and Paul Biya of Cameroon. Developing nations,
on the other hand, being politically weaker in the international arena, and highly dependent on
Western powers for humanitarian aid, are not in a position to initiate investigations and
prosecutions of European and North American nationals, particularly where there is no personal
or territorial connection with their country. While it true that Chilean judge Juan Guzman has
initiated an investigation of former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in relation to
war crimes allegedly committed in the context of ‘Operation Condor’ in South America during

45
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the 1970’s, it should be noted that this does not constitutes an exercise of universal jurisdiction,
since the crimes alleged were committed against Chilean nationals.47

A final concern that has been raised in relation to increasing the frequency with which universal
jurisdiction is exercised, is that it could substantially undermine the role of the International
Criminal Court. Art. 17 of the Rome Statute states,

1.

Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is
inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless
the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness
or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; 48

Therefore, assuming the existence of universal jurisdiction in absentia, a bona fide investigation
by any state of any of the offences listed in Art. 5 of the Statute (there is arguably universal
jurisdiction for all of these crimes) would preclude a hearing by the I.C.C. This would effectively
render the court unnecessary, assuming that countries such as Belgium insist on exercising
universal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted under international law. The D.R.C. has
suggested that the exercise of universal jurisdiction may even run contrary to the object and
purpose of the Rome Statute, in contravention of art. 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of

47
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Treaties.49 On the other hand, it is arguable that if the I.C.C. is successful in bringing criminals to
justice, municipal courts and prosecutors will stop exercising universal jurisdiction altogether, in
which case there would be little point in recognizing the existence of universal jurisdiction in
absentia.

B.

Fewer Delays in initiating investigations and prosecutions:

In the event that universal jurisdiction in absentia is recognized, countries desiring to exercise
such jurisdiction will not be required to wait for the accused to travel to their territory (a thing he
or she is not likely to do if he or she is aware that the State actively exercises its universal
jurisdiction). Thus investigations and prosecutions could be initiated more rapidly. This would
have two main advantages. Firstly, it would bring perpetrators to justice more quickly. Secondly,
it would increase the likelihood of conviction, since it would facilitate the gathering of evidence
and testimony. As Thieroff and Amley point out,

There are a variety of ... pragmatic reasons for the speedy introduction of information that tends to
incriminate the accused. For example, evidence tends to degrade over time. Witnesses may forget important
facts and details about the actions of the accused or the context in which the alleged violations took place.
They may also die from natural causes.50

However, these arguments are subject to challenge. As has already mentioned, the initiation of
an investigation or prosecution will not necessarily result in the extradition and incarceration of
the accused at any stage, particularly where his or her home State refuses to cooperate. In
addition, with respect to evidence, since the exercise of universal jurisdiction necessarily means
that the crime will have been committed in another State, there are substantial costs associated
49

“Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, 15 May 2001, at para. 91, Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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with evidence gathering, such as those associated with having witnesses flown in, or having the
tribunal visit the State in which the alleged crimes have taken place in order to hear testimony.51
In addition, State officials in the jurisdiction where the evidence lies may be uncooperative, and
make it impossible to visit crime scenes, or refuse to allow investigators to access witnesses.52
Even where such evidence can be obtained, it will be difficult for foreign officials to verify its
authenticity, or interpret it properly (particularly where testimony in a foreign language is
concerned.) The result is that foreign tribunals and officials will generally have access evidence
of questionable authenticity, and in smaller quantities, and which they may be unable to properly
understand. This would be particularly problematic in cases of universal jurisdiction in absentia,
since not even the accused would be available to act as a source of information for prosecution
and defense counsel. The result is that the likelihood of obtaining a conviction when universal
jurisdiction in absentia is exercised is less likely than advocates argue.

C.

Trials in Absentia:

While not generally permitted in common law states such as Canada, the United States, and the
United Kingdom, criminal trials in absentia are accepted practice is civil law countries.53 States
have not as of yet attempted to try international criminals in absentia in their municipal courts on
the basis of universal jurisdiction. However, in absentia proceedings have been used in the
context of the I.C.T.Y. to try international criminals who fail to appear before the tribunal.
Although trials are not held before the tribunal unless the accused is present, under Rule 61 of
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the I.C.T.Y. Rules of Procedure, if the accused fails to appear, a public hearing is held in which
witnesses are called and evidence is presented, in order to determine whether the indictment
against the defendant should “confirmed”, and an international arrest warrant issued.54 Rule 61
was adopted in order to provide a forum for condemning defendants’ actions, and voicing the
allegations of their victims. This procedure has been invoked in the cases of Radko Mladic and
Radovan Karadic, two Bosnian Serbs who failed to appear before the I.C.T.Y.55 If universal
jurisdiction in absentia is recognized, States would be able to conduct Rule 61-type proceedings,
or even conduct trials in absentia of individuals accused of serious international crimes in
municipal courts, particularly civilian jurisdictions that allow for such proceedings in their
national legislation. It is arguable though that this may be an undesirable development in
international law.

Trials and other judicial proceedings in absentia may violate art. 14(3)(d) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides for the right of the accused to be present
during his or her trial.56 Although the United Nations Human Rights Committee has expressed
the opinion that an accused who fails to appear waives his or her rights under art. 14(3)(d),57 this
position is disputed by certain jurists.58 In addition, it has been argued that the absence of the
accused in such proceedings will lead juries and officials to draw the inappropriate inference that
54
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because the accused may be absent he or she is a fugitive and therefore probably guilty, even if
there is not sufficient evidence to support this conclusion.59 In addition, it has been suggested
that it is an essential aspect of the proper administration of justice, particularly in common law
jurisdictions which have adopted an adversarial system that the accused be present to oversee the
work of defense counsel, seeking out improper conduct by the judge or the jury, or pointing out
errors of fact alleged by the prosecution.60 It has also been argued that the shame experienced by
an accused who is present at trial is an essential part of the punishment that the guilty ought to
suffer.61 Finally, the legitimacy of proceedings against international criminals will be
undermined by trials in absentia, as the absence of the accused would convey a message which
would bring the judicial system of the forum State into disrepute, i.e. that the State exercising
jurisdiction and its judicial system are powerless to bring criminals before their tribunals, or that
the defendant does not believe that that he will obtain a fair trial in the State asserting universal
jurisdiction.62

VI.

Conclusion:

It is unfortunate that the majority of the I.C.J. declined to comment on the issue of universal
jurisdiction in absentia in the Arrest Warrant Case. However, the conclusions reached by four of
the eight justices who commented on the issue of jurisdiction raise serious concerns for
international jurists. Their analysis suggests that this expansive form of jurisdiction is currently
permitted in international law, under the Lotus principle, or likely to become permitted in the
near future under an emerging rule of customary international law. This development may be
58
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inconsistent with certain historical justifications for the exercise of universal jurisdiction. In
addition, the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia is likely to pose important problems
from a policy point of view. While the increase in frequency with which such jurisdiction would
be exercised would have the effect of decreasing the impunity currently enjoyed by many
perpetrators of serious international crimes, it is also likely to pose a threat to the stability of
international relations, lead to multiple claims against individual defendants, and undermine the
role played by the I.C.C. In addition, while the existence of universal jurisdiction in absentia
would result in fewer delays in bringing defendants to justice, officials would be required to
make decisions on the basis of little evidence which might be of questionable authenticity.
Finally, universal jurisdiction in absentia would make it possible for countries to try international
criminals with no connection to their State. This would call the fairness and hence the legitimacy
of such proceedings into question, and bring judicial systems which exercise universal
jurisdiction into disrepute. These considerations should be borne in mind by governments as they
shape State practice in the coming years, and by international and municipal tribunals called
upon to rule on the scope of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction in the future.

62
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